Viktor Orban changes the constitution of Hungary. The election defeat looks into his eyes

Who does he have to show this dominance? Who doubts his full power over the state? Orban is afraid of someone?

– It's not even about fear, it's just a method of exercising power. This is not communication addressed to citizens, but to other political parties. Especially since the opposition has been growing in strength recently. Orban wants to show that he can do anything. The second thing that the changes he usually made in the Constitution were highly polarizing changes – but not in such a sense that they divided the political scene into the Orban camp and the rest, but in such that they divided the opposition internally. The introduction of hard, zero -tin solutions means that the parties must define and react, and by taking up topics that divide them internally, Orban obtains tools for breaking opponents and effective action. In other words: it demobilizes the opposition.

Today, the only opposition to worry about is the party of respect and freedom (Tisza). In the polls, the ruling Fidesz is ahead of. Posting moral topics into public debate – education of children, a ban on organizing equality marches, legal definition only two sexes, LGBTQ community rights – is to hit it?

– Absolutely. Tisza leads the whole opposition, various parties from right to left – we have groups there, which are declared freethinkers, supporters of broad civil liberties, but there is also even centric -right Tisza, which escapes from worldview topics. Thus, for voters from a large urban center like Budapest – the capital is one third of all voters in Hungary – it may be less reliable.

Is this the beginning of the parliamentary campaign before next year's elections? Orban tries to mobilize and harden his electorate?

– Yes. I will say even more: although the elections are only in a year, we are already at the last straight of this campaign. Orban runs a very modern and aggressive style of political marketing, in which the campaign lasts not over the last few months of the term, but from the first day after winning the election. For four years, the polarization and mobilization campaign is conducted non-stop, and in the pre-election period, i.e. a year before the election as now, in particular, it accelerates.

The opposition, especially Tisza, has a chance not to fall into the trap of Orban and somehow win this situation? Or at least not to lose her?

– Both the party structure and public opinion polls show that Tisza has real chances to win next year's elections. Union under a common banner of many political forces begins to threaten Orban, who has always used the breakdown and conflict of the opposition. With the political system in force in Hungary, this gave a large bonus to Fidesz. Tisza has a good chance of this problem and overcome this barrier. Then the only issue will remain how far Orban will go, seeing that he is losing in Wyborcza's fight and fearing the consequences of this defeat.

Tisza's strength and main driving force is Magyar. Removing it would give a good chance that the party will fall apart as a result of centrifugal trends. And thus the problem of Orban and the threat to his omnipotence will disappear

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What are these steps?

– For example, like with Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey. Before the presidential election planned for 2023, the Opposition of the Ekrem Imamogle opposition was sentenced to the alleged “insult to state officials” to two years and seven months in prison, and it was forbidden to perform public functions. It was the mayor of Istanbul that was to be the main candidate of the opposition in the next presidential election. The later appeal brought an effect, but someone else was the opposition candidate in the election. The same is repeated, moreover, now – in mid -March imamogle, which was to be the opposition candidate in the 2028 election, he was detained on allegations of alleged financial abuse and support of the authorities considered by the authorities as a terrorist organization of the Kurdistan working party.

Peter Magyar, leader of Tisza, will divide the fate of the imamogle?

– Yes, it's in the game. Tisza's strength and main driving force is Magyar. Removing it would give a good chance that the party will fall apart as a result of centrifugal trends. And thus Orban's problem and the threat to his omnipotence will disappear.

The moral thread is aimed at the opposition. Who are the changes to the constitution regarding the temporary suspension of citizenship of persons recognized as a threat to the security of the country and having double citizenship?

– The documents that the Orban's government made public shows that this amendment does not apply to citizens of allied countries, understood as European Union countries, only citizens from outside allied countries – i.e. Belarus, Russia or China. They would meet the conditions contained in the Act on the sovereignty of the country, to suspend their citizenship in case of suspected action against Hungary.

Hungarians will feel the changes pushed by Orban? Will they affect their daily lives?

– The only influence that this may have – we know it from Poland – these are possible repercussions from the EU if there were more payments for Hungary. Orban would take advantage of such sanctions to say to Hungary once again that the EU tells Hungary for conducting sovereign policy and walking his own way, that he wants to change Hungary like communism by force, and the Orban's government is the last bastion that protects against this country.