War in Ukraine. Possible changes on the front. Three scenarios for autumn

The situation in Kursk region well illustrates the basic problem in forecasting the course of war: the fact that some things cannot be predicted.

As observers, we have access to a limited amount of information. Hence the variant nature and conventionality of the considerations undertaken in the text, in which I try to answer the question: Breakthrough, stabilization, breakdown? What will autumn bring on the Russian-Ukrainian front?

Out of necessity, I will allow myself to be brief, and to maintain the order of the argument, I will divide it scenarios into three categories. The point of reference for me will be the situation of the Ukrainians and their army – I will start with the optimistic variant, then move on to the moderate one, and finally the pessimistic one.

The Ukrainians entered the Kursk region as if through butter, The Kremlin is unable to take action that would allow the immediate displacement of the enemy. Russia is preparing for a long war on its own territory, mobilising considerable forces that it would lack elsewhere.

The Kursk operation revealed the façade of Russian statehood in the border regions of the country. The administration fled, the residents made no attempts at civic resistance. As one resident of Suja put it: “Nobody cared whether Russia was here or not.” We have already seen this passivity of the Russians – civilians and services – during Prigozhin's coup.

Russians declaratively they support the state's policy, but they have no intention of risking their lives for it. Suffice it to say that military recruitment is almost entirely based on financial incentives (a lot of money by Russian standards) – and this is happening after a long propaganda campaign in which the Kremlin compares the “special operation” to the Great Patriotic War. The USSR had already faced an ideological void, Putin wanted to fill this void nationalist-religious-imperial fervor. As you can see, with poor results.

Now let's imagine “Kursk operation on steroids“. Conducted with larger forces, on a larger area, without restrictions on the use of equipment provided to the Ukrainians. For the decaying Russian state, with its passive society, it would probably be a knockout blow, resulting in cascading collapse of the Putin regime.

Is it possible? Today we already know that The Ukrainians have “hidden” considerable reserves, some of which were used in the Kursk operation. We cannot rule out that this the potential is significantly greater. The question remains open as to how the West views the transfer and continuation of the war to Russian territory. It seems that one of the effects of the actions in Kursk Oblast is thethe growing conviction about Russian bluffs, regarding “impassable red lines”. In other words, Kiev's allies they are less and less afraid of “escalation”If this were followed by intensified military aid, the Ukrainians could achieve the desired victory and reach a peace agreement with Putin's successors – even before winter.

Let's go back to the present and the realities we know, i.e. limited Ukrainian involvement in Russia.

The ZSU offensive in Kursk region has slowed down, but the Ukrainians are still achieving successes and it would not be an exaggeration to assume that their scale will eventually will force the Kremlin to radically cut the quota stationed in Ukraine. Let's remember, today it is 540 thousand soldiersalmost half of Putin's entire army and over 80 percent of the Federation's land forces. Of these more than half a million people, approximately 300,000 are soldiers of combat formations. Every third of them will return to Russiaand if within the next two or three weeks the Ukrainians in the Kursk region are not stopped and forced to go on the defensive.

Such an outflow of forces and resources would give ZSU opportunity to carry out offensive operations, whose goal would be to liberate the indigenous Ukrainian territories. Let us remember, however, that the Russians are very strongly “they have dug themselves into the ground” in the occupied territories – we saw the effects of this during last year's unsuccessful Ukrainian counter-offensive in Zaporozhye. Today, there are more fortifications, they are more developed, deeper; at the same time, they are constructed in such a way that maintaining them does not tie up too many forces. To put it bluntly, it is worth assuming that Russians could carry out two tasks at once for a relatively long time – defend the conquests in Ukraine and the troops withdrawn from the Dnieper try to regain lost territories in Russia.

Especially the second type of involvement of the Federation's armed forces would be the essence of the moderate scenario. Even if the transfer of the burden of war to the aggressor's country for a period of many weeks, maybe months, was not accompanied by offensive actions by Ukrainians “at home” (because the Ukrainian army may not have the appropriate resources), in total it would be the situation is favorable for Kiev. Russians on the entire Ukrainian front go into defense mode would give me a breather ZSU allowed us to better prepare our own fortifications in Zaporozhye and Donbas. It would be crucial if events started to go the way the Russians wanted and they were able to do what they have been doing so far – go on the offensive in winter.

A possible third scenario of fighting on the Ukrainian front would depend on many variables, including geopolitical ones, such as: US presidential election result.

Possible America's about-face would certainly affect the condition of the Ukrainian armywhich builds a significant part of its technical advantage over Putin's troops based on equipment from overseas. But let's not look too far into the future (the US elections are in November, but the new president won't take office until January next year) – unfavorable events for Ukraine may occur earlier. They are what make up pessimistic scenario.

Let's assume that the Russians first slow down and then quickly (over the course of several weeks) throw the Ukrainians out of the Kursk region. At the same time, they manage break through the Ukrainian defense in Donbas and approach the last in the Donetsk region, symbolically extremely important borders in Kramatorsk and SlovianskThey begin to attempt to occupy the metropolis, which is accompanied by intensified air and missile campaignundertaken with the intention of “finishing off” the Ukrainian energy sector before winter.

It is not difficult to imagine that even without the efforts of Russian propaganda (its disinforming and demotivating “inserts” into the Ukrainian information circulation), on the Dnieper the mood would drop. Probably more than after the defeat in Zaporozhye. The “wise” ones would appearwho “knew from the beginning” that the Kursk operation was “a mistake, a waste of potential, a weakening of key defensive lines” – and that “now we have the consequences.”

Judging by the condition of the Ukrainian political class, there would be pressure for purges in the army again. If they were to happen, personal chaos would further weaken ZSU. The weather – a cool autumn – in the face of dramatic energy shortages would bring another refugee exodus. I do not think that all this will translate into a spectacular collapse of the Ukrainian defense operation, but the space for rotten compromises would certainly increase“Why do we need all this?” Ukrainians would ask themselves, doubting the point of continuing to fight. “Why do you need all this?” such voices could also be heard from the allies. And of course from Moscow.