War in Ukraine. Russia in a trap. Therefore, the conflict cannot end

Kiev's allies do not want victory Russiathat's obvious. But they also do not want escalation, fearing that it could lead to a nuclear confrontation. Therefore, there is no question of immediate and unconditional invitation Ukrainy do NATO or about sending allied troops to the Dnieper as security guarantors.

The West's reluctance to engage directly is one of the boundary conditions defining the Ukraine-Russia relationship; it is also a variable that will have a significant impact on the way the war in the East ends. Zelensky is also aware of this – so why did he announce this unrealistic plan?

His presentation should be treated as an element of Ukrainian internal policy. And assume that the intention behind it was to shift the responsibility to the allies, as those who “did not help enough.” Yes, probably the president intends to justify the decision to make z Moscow conversationswhich will result in coming to terms with territorial losses. This is a cunning strategy, all the more credible because the West is actually restrained. And it is not only about Zelensky's own survival, but also about ensuring that Ukraine does not catch fire from the inside when the “rotten-compromise” terms of peace become known. It's easier to come to terms with loss when you know that those who could help won't help.

The issue of the “victory plan” highlights the existence (and consequences) of the Western fear of escalation. Another marginal variable is equally important: the real capabilities of the Russian army. Contrary to the swaggering rhetoric, Putin's army is not able to conquer Ukraine. And in 2024, it suffered a disgraceful failure, because this is how the effects of the program carried out since October last year should be assessed. offensive. It did not lead to the collapse of the front, in fact, during it the Ukrainians transferred military operations to the territory of the Federation. The Russians captured several towns and several dozen villages, they moved 30 km in points, but at a cost of PLN 400,000. (!) killed and wounded. Today, they veto these terrible losses by recruiting 50-year-olds and reaching for “volunteers” from… North Korea.

Those who claim that a war of attrition is being waged in Ukraine – and the Ukrainians are also suffering heavy losses – and that territorial gains are of secondary importance are not wrong. They do, but they still count as a running “spec op” success rate. And ultimately, this war is about land (its inhabitants and resources). Bleeding out the opponent – causing him to “let his guard down” when exhausted – is only a means to an end. On The Kremlinu know that in the fight, at most the Ukrainians will be able to “snatch” the rest of the Donetsk Oblast from the Ukrainians (and this is where Russian efforts outside Kursk are focused). But they also hope that the intensity of the exchange of blows will weaken Ukraine enough that, when talks take place, they will be able to persuade Kiev to withdraw from the Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. This is Moscow's “full rate as far as possible”.

The Ukrainian strategy is to limit territorial losses and – as in the case of the Russians – to “drain the blood” of the enemy's war machine in order to ultimately weaken its negotiating position. This is actually what the war is about today, although for the full picture an “American thread” should be added. Both sides are trying to reach the point where this will be possible understanding the consequences of the US presidential elections. Moscow would like new pressure administration forced Kyiv to make concessionsKyiv hopes that its overseas ally “will not trip it up.”

It's hard to say what it will be like – the polls in the United States are so balanced that predicting the winner is a guess. However, it seems that regardless of whether he wins Kamala Harris Whether Donald Trump, Washington he will seek extinguishing the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The methods of this pressure remain unknown – depending on who takes over the White House – although it is highly probable that the new/old administration will focus on “realistic” scenarios. In which there is no longer room for the reconquista of lost lands. This brings us to the third boundary condition: Ukrainian (dis)power. In the realities of the aid “drip” – and also due to the internal weaknesses of the state and society – the Ukrainian army is not and will not be able to throw the invasion troops out of the country.

So freezing the front and looking for areas for concessions/profits through negotiations – this is the prospect that both sides of the conflict face. In the case of Ukraine, the peace process must be carried out simultaneously with efforts to obtain external security guarantees. Russia is not famous for keeping its promises, and the scenario that it will regain strength and try to “play for the full” again can hardly be considered exaggerated. “Own nuclear weapons or NATO membership” – this is how Zelensky put it in his conversation with Trump. He didn't bluff, he didn't blackmail, he didn't fantasize about returning to the status of a nuclear power (which Ukraine has no chance of at the moment), but only pointed out that without Western protection, his country will sooner or later fall into Russia's hands.

And although this is a realistic diagnosis, the “nuclear or NATO” alternative seems false. Ukraine can also gain appropriate guarantees in another way. What? Requirement of formal neutrality – what Moscow is and will continue to press and what the Trump camp is leaning towards – does not have to mean the disarmament of the Ukrainian army. Switzerlandand until recently also Swedenremained neutral, while maintaining relatively strong, well-equipped and trained armies. Inviolability resulted from other features of the statehood of both countries, but the element of deterrence also played its role.

So if Ukraine's admission to NATO is a problem (a risk that the largest members of the Alliance are not willing to take), you can choose a half-measure: arm the Ukrainian army to the teeth. After several dozen months of full-scale war, the Russians know well that their weapons are inferior to Western systems in most categories. They are aware that what saves them today is the relatively small amount of these weapons in Ukrainian equipment. A few F-16s do not make a difference, but 150-200 machines would wipe out the Russian air force from the Ukrainian sky. It is and would be the same with tanks, artillery, and missile weapons, especially medium and long-range ones. Would Russia go to another war if it had such an opponent? It cannot be ruled out, but the risk would certainly be lower.

In this context, it is worth paying attention to two things. Formal peace would impact the risks they face today supplies of Western equipment to Ukraine. American and European weapons are effectively killing Russians, which could push the Kremlin to escalate at some point. Maybe or maybe not, this is what they fear in the West and this is where the reality of the “drip” and restrictions on the use of weapons come from. However, the situation in which the equipment will be used “only” for deterrence will be different. To better illustrate, let's use an example: our friend was fighting with a strange man who attacked him. We threw a knife at the attacker, he used it and escaped with his life. In another scenario, we also give a friend a dangerous tool – but not during a fight, but just in case, because we know that someone is waiting for him. The effects may be the same, but psychologically they are completely different situations, the second one is much easier for us and to some extent (subjectively) eliminates responsibility.

But the Russians show extraordinary determination in this war – understood as nonchalance towards the losses they suffer – why would they lack it in the future? – someone might ask, doubting the deterrent power of the Westernized Ukrainian army. The Russian “pain threshold” may indeed be high, but I am more convinced by a different interpretation of Russian involvement. In social psychology we talk about: “sunk cost trap”. This phrase describes a situation when we have invested time, money, energy (any other resources) into a project and we continue with the investment even though it is no longer profitable. “Spec-operation” is just such an investment – she's already “eaten” too much to back out now. What if you could turn back time…

Yes, I assume Russians are rational. Yes, their rationality is accompanied by a different understanding of the value of human life, and many decisions are made after an incorrect assessment of the situation, but as a rule, having “black and white”, The Kremlin wouldn't get into trouble. In the context described, this “black on white” means militarized Ukrainian neutrality. The West's consent to its pacifist/defenseless version would be capitulation. But let's not anticipate the facts…