War in Ukraine. What can Donald Trump give Russia? “The Illusion of Strength”

Before I expand on the topic of consequences, let's “break the spell” of the situation at the front. There are numerous reports that the operation was defensive Ukrainy “things are falling apart” that there will be a breakthrough at any moment and Kyiv will surrender. This is nonsense and part of an asymmetric narrative.

It remains the main goal of the Russians capture the Donetsk region – no more, no less. October was the second month in a row when Russian territorial gains approached the level of 500 square kilometers, and this year's total “earned goods” exceeded 2,000 square kilometers. square kilometers. The aggressors have not recorded such gains since the spring of 2022, so we can talk about acceleration and a breakthrough.

But we must remember that these are pieces of Ukrainian territory. Before 2014, Ukraine had 600,000. square kilometers of area. Today the area is controlled by the Kiev government is smaller by one fifth. Therefore, it still remains huge and this vastness is of great importance, as discussed later in the text.

Russians occupy about 60 percent. Donetsk Oblast – they have more or less left to conquer 10 thousand square kilometers If they “absorb” them like in September and October, they will need… 20 months to achieve their goal.

Of course Moscow she would like it to be 20 days or weeks, not months – and the Russian army command will do a lot to increase efficiency. But let's look at the costs: Russian losses are hugealmost one and a half thousand of them are killed and injured every day.

There is a shortage of volunteers to take part in this “grinding” – since the invasion began, the remuneration of the specoperation participants has been increased six times – The Kremlin so he reaches for foreign help (Koreans…). It is reasonable to assume that in the long run “it won't work out for the Russians”, they won't be able to cope. And yet they have other problems.

I will point them out in a moment, but first it is worth noting that the Russians have learned to “follow the flow”. So far, the ossified structure of their army almost excluded independent actions by lower-level commanders. “They ordered us to take over village And it doesn't matter that the enemy fled and you could have tried to take advantage of it and take out the Y village as well.

“An order is an order”, they waited for what the mountain would decide. Well, now Russian captains, majors and colonels are no longer waiting, there is a chance for success, they are taking advantage of it. The effects are visible – and although they are still on a micro scale, we are dealing with them a mental change with great potential.

The Russians have had quite a lot of such micro-breaches in recent weeks. But does their sum constitute grounds for claiming that “the front has collapsed”? No, the Muscovites did not make a wide breach – at least 20-30 km – and did not reach the rear of the Ukrainian army to a depth of another 20-30 km. This is the “front collapse” scenario, this is the course of events it would mean critical situation of Ukrainians branches in Donbas.

The fact is that in some places Ukrainians have problems with establishing new defense lines. And those who are ill-prepared give up sooner. This is not only the result of rapid repetition Russian pressure, but also material and human shortages and poor command. Fortunately, the Russians are unable to turn local successes into something more.

While they could gather a larger number of troops in one of the four most hot spots in Donbas and, consequently, make a wider breach, there is no way they could “pour” into this gap a sufficiently strong contingent that would be able to “arm” the Ukrainian rear. Because there is no such quota.

Given the scale of operations taking place in Ukraine, it would take several dozen thousand soldiers and thousands of tanks and combat vehicles to break through the front and successfully penetrate the enemy's operational depth. Powerful artillery and aviation support, an efficient air defense umbrella and efficient logistics.

It was once believed that the Russians had such a unit, the 1st Tank Army, but its status as a reserve intended for quick offensive operations has repeatedly turned out to be a pipe dream. The reality is that linear units have 40 percent necessary equipmentthat they compensate for their weaknesses with human mass. It is possible to gain something locally with this, but it is impossible to conduct deep rallies “on your feet”.

And then there is the aforementioned vastness, which Russian generals feared from the very beginning. This is why the original assumptions of specoperation focused on occupying administrative centers – no one wanted to venture into the Ukrainian interior beyond the need to reach the largest cities.

Today it could also turn out that Russian “raiders” would be left in vain. After breaking through the front they would not come into combat contact with subsequent enemy units, because this one would be somewhere else. He would regroup away and strike at a convenient moment; yes, based on the rules of maneuver warfare, the Ukrainians defeated the Russians in the winter of 2022.

It then turned out that the huge territorial gains were illusory and that it was necessary to go to Russia or to the areas that had been absorbed with limited forces. These absorption possibilities – still limited – are the key to understanding Russian weakness, also in its most recent version: local successes in the Donetsk region, which will not turn into a great Ukrainian catastrophe.

To summarize the considerations so far: leading to the complete collapse of the Ukrainian state is possible beyond the reach of the Federation's armed forces. Why is this conclusion so important? Because only the occupation of most of Ukraine and the vassalization of the rest would justify Moscow's claims of victory.

Scenarios of more or less “rotten compromise” mean Russian defeat. Not only in relation to the goals of the intervention in 2022. Mainly because of costs. Russia is devastated on many levels. Three of them are the most obvious: military, economic and demographic.

The war in Ukraine canceled the effect of 15 years of army modernization some. It lost the most valuable equipment, a lot of the best personnel, and most importantly, it drained the post-Soviet ammunition stocks and is today close to the final drain of resources hardware from that period. The “rent from the USSR” is ending, which is all the more troublesome because current production capacity is unable to compensate for these losses.

The economy is alive today thanks to Chinese drip i own arms production. Which, yes, gives people jobs and higher earnings, but its effects are completely wasted – literally and figuratively – in Ukraine. This burning is financed by savings that are disappearing at an alarming rate.

Putin's state is eating up capital that it could invest elsewhere. His condition is well illustrated by the analogy of a fox chasing its tail. There is movement, energy, the illusion of life. However, the animal does not rush forward, but turns in circles, de facto stands still and what is worst for him, he gradually devours his own tail.

It is a shot in the arm to send hundreds of thousands of men to death in Ukraine. The scale of war losses is terrifying, and yet we must add the emigration around the war and the pandemic hecatomb that preceded the war. Over the past five years Russia lost 3.5 million citizenslargely from age groups and professional categories that are important or even key to the economy.

And let's add to this the falling fertility rate and average life expectancy (which is several years shorter than in the most developed countries), and the dramatic decline in the quality of public services (after all, to 60 percent state spending goes to the defense sector) – as a result, we can talk about a serious crisis that is already ongoing and whose most serious consequences are lurking on the horizon.

And yet there are also the realities of the “plywood state” – any infrastructure, poorly maintained, and recently – spec-operation! – not looked at at all. Roads, bridges, transmission networks, waterworks, factories, public facilities. It is such a country, with such an army and such facilities, that is currently at war with Ukraine. The fact that he now has the initiative does not result from his strength, but from the opponent's weakness. Relative weakness, because if the actual asymmetry was greater, it would have been “swept away” a long time ago.

And so we come to new president USA. Trump it can give Putin and the Russians (or only the Russians, but Putin will use it) the illusion of strength and agency. This is what will happen if the United States abandons Ukraine and then gives up Europe. They will abandon, that is, they will force Kyiv to conclude peace on terms that are more comfortable for the Kremlin.

For example, Ukraine not only agrees to the status quo, but also withdraws from the Zaporozhye and Kherson oblasts covered by claims. Which will still be a failure for Moscow (because Russia wanted more), at the same time taking the form of a change of borders so serious that it can be sold as a Russian success.

– Let the Russians live with this illusion of success – someone might say. Well, no. Illusions and imaginations influence our lives. As a sociologist, this is how I perceive the functions of religious cults. No one has seen the gods, their existence is accepted on faith, and this faith permeates all aspects of our everyday life.

It orders them and has the power to create communities, institutions, codes and morality. It unites, but also destroys, manifesting itself in religious wars and persecutions. Various ideologies work similarly – even the most detached from reality they can create an organizationally efficient regime. And this may turn out to be toxic in relations with other communities.

Well, if the Russians believe the story about the spectacular victory in Ukraine, they will feed it to their imperialism, and they may not only think it was worth it. They may feel the desire for more.

And here we come back to Trump – the president will not write the US out of NATOhas no such rights. But it can withdraw troops from Europe and paralyze the Alliance with decision-making obstruction. These fears do not come from nothing, but from Trump's declarations and from the experience of his first presidency, when he dramatically limited the American military presence on the continent.

What if he does it again? If it weakens NATO? Before that, it will give the Russians a sense of strength by helping to end the war more Moscow conditions?

Please recall under what conditions Russia entered the conflict in 2022? The decision to commit aggression was based on three beliefs: about your own strength, about Ukraine's weakness i about the weakness of the Westprimarily America. The latter was to be verified in the summer of 2021, when US forces withdrew from Afghanistan in panic. “Such states will not hinder us,” the Kremlin said. This and the other two assumptions turned out to be illusions.

But Putin does not have to succumb to illusions, he can have a reliable understanding of the situation. In this case, the awareness that the war in Ukraine had broken the backbone of his army. He could therefore do nothing, but the crises he caused to Russia would happen sooner or later “they will explode in his face”, will cause waves of social dissatisfaction, probably even rebellion.

It's better to “run forward”, enter another “victorious war”. Russian citizens are susceptible to such stimuli – they will say to themselves: – We are poor, but we beat someone again! They will compensate for deficiencies with aggression. At some point, reality will sink in, but Putin doesn't need decades. He is an old man, he has a dozen or so years left to live. Trump can give him comfort for the next four.

And again someone may say: – Damn, they won't attack Poland. No, Russia is “too short” for that. But Putin may target Georgia Whether Moldovaat least one of the Baltic states. Play va banque, convinced that “Trump won't lift a finger.” Nod or not, We'll find out after the fact. When another country will receive the “rocket benefits” of Russian Mir, when – in the worst-case scenario for Poland – the conditions for us as a country to go to war will be formally met. These may be the consequences of Trump's defiance.

So it's good for the next US president he was aware of Russian weaknesses and the consequences of not noticing them. And apart from everything else, it would be an exceptional perversity and malice of fate to force Ukraine to submit to the will of such a damaged enemy…